The division EOC had to provide the commander with critical information "just as you do in war," Marcello recalled. Important data included the status and changes in status of every soldier. "We were trying to get a grasp on what was happening to our soldiers," General Steele said. By 1600 the 82d Airborne Division also had established a tactical EOC on Green Ramp to help verify the names of all the casualties, their status, and their evacuation destination. Because the crash produced many victims simultaneously, some were tagged inappropriately.

Womack's chief of surgery, Colonel Eggebroten, recalled: "We spent a long time in the afternoon and evening trying to figure out who we had and the numbers of patients that we had. We probably need to put more PAD people in our MASCAL plan.7' The division found it easier to track down the casualties in units that had accurate jump manifests. By midnight the division EOC had uncovered the names and status of all the soldiers injured in the crash.

In coordination with Womack PAD personnel, the 82d discovered that its 1st and 3d Brigades and Division Support Command were involved in the accident. Most of the casualties, however, were in the 2nd Battalion, 504th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 505th Infantry. Other injured soldiers belonged to corps units, such as the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade.[3]

To check on the status of patients and to provide family support, the division EOC created communications outposts at each regional hospital. Portable tactical satellite terminals, FM radios, and cellular telephones were used to communicate with the detailed liaison officer on duty at the nurses station of each hospital's intensive care unit. Each casualty's family was assisted by another division representative who met the family at the airport, arranged for transportation, and helped in any way.

The EOC also used a contracting officer to reserve lodging at local hotels for families who did not stay on post. Finally, the 82d Airborne Division sent a liaison team to Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio to check on the severely burned casualties transferred to the U. S. Army Institute of Surgical Research (USAISR), colocated at Brooke Army Medical Center, and to take care of their families' needs. By this time "the families were starting to roll in," recalled General Steele.[4]

General Steele was known as a compassionate and caring commander, possessing a strong moral character. He and his subordinate, Command Sgt. Maj. Steven R. Slocum, saw what needed to be done for the soldiers and did not hesitate to make it happen. Other casualties, not from the 82d Airborne Division, benefited from Steele's and Slocum's determination to do everything that possibly could be done to help the accident victims and their families. According to Steele, Slocum "did yeoman's work" in the aftermath of the tragedy.[5]

Because of the accident General Steele required that officers and noncommissioned officers from the 82d's 1st and 3d Brigades receive casualty assistance training. Col. John P. Abizaid, the commander of the 1st Brigade, and Col. John Schmader, the commander of the 3d Brigade, were on the casualty notification teams and usually informed the families of their loss.

Within twenty-four hours of the crash the teams had tracked down and apprised the family or friends of each soldier who had perished. Steele believed that the immediate training of casualty assistance officers "enabled them to notify quickly the ones who lost loved ones and ease the anxieties of wives and family members."

At the battalion level, command and control of the accident's aftermath rested squarely on the shoulders of the unit commanders—Lt. Col. Lloyd Austin of the 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry, and Colonel McChrystal of the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry. For McChrystal, "the accident was an organizational management challenge."

He established the battalion EOC at battalion headquarters under the command sergeant major and the S-3 (operations officer). He also set up a small command post at Womack and, for three hours on the twentythird' on the airfield. The battalion EOC did its own casualty accountI ability, hospital liaison, and family I support, coordinating all with the division EOC. McChrystal ordered the two units on training to return to Fort Bragg, prohibited early dissemination of information about casualties, and tried to bring the wives of his injured paratroopers into the company areas to ensure that they received the care and support they required.

He stayed at the hospital command post until 0500 on the twenty-fourth, creating master lists of tasks and the people to perform them. He sent soldiers from each company to Womack to serve "almost as reaction type guys," to take care of "the thousand little things that would come up." He appointed liaison people to be with the families of casualties, whether dead or alive, and sold~ers to participate in the next-of-kin notification process.

He coordinated everything with corps, division, and brigade personnel and "got tremendous support from them."'Chaplain Bebber drove to Womack, after his experiences on Green Ramp. His accessibility to wards and rooms enabled him to locate patients faster than the record-keeping personnel at the hospital EOC. When he found injured soldiers from his brigade, he notified his command.

He checked on the condition of the soldier he had rescued on Green Ramp, having noticed the victim's dog tags at the time of the incident. Seeking rest and support, Bebber entered the Weaver Conference Room, where chaplains had begun round-the-clock manning, and "debriefed [himself] with other survivors and those who needed to know what had happened." After midnight he went home. Before entering the house, Bebber removed his uniform so, in his words, "I would not take its smell and sight into the house. I did not want my family, especially my children, to see it. Its horror remains clear in my mind and senses even now."

BACK                                    NEXT